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On December 11, 2017, 25 member states of the European Union (EU) formally launched the 
permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in the area of defense. Although the legal provisions 
behind PESCO have been in place since the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, they have not translated into any 
concrete initiative until recently. A multitude of factors from the British decision to exit the EU and 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 to the growing rift in foreign policy and security issues 
between the EU and the Trump administration, including doubts over the commitment of the latter 
towards the transatlantic alliance, have played a key role in the EU’s decision to move toward a more 
integrated security and defense policy.  
PESCO makes it possible for the participating member states to develop joint military capabilities 
through a modular, project-based approach and deploy each state’s troops in joint operations. The 
agreement was signed with the expectation that member states will regularly increase their defense 
budgets. While PESCO can be considered an important step in the longer history of European 
defense integration, it is still too early to predict how PESCO will affect wider strategic convergence 
among EU member states. This will undoubtedly hinge on a variety of factors, the most notable of 
which is the willingness on the part of the member states to participate in PESCO and take part in the 
deployment of ambitious defense projects.  
In accordance with Article 42 (6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), PESCO is established by 
͞those member states whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more 
binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions.͟ 
Thus, in terms of institutional design, PESCO constitutes an exemplary case of differentiated 
integration where only member states that are willing and able can join. PESCO includes all member 
states except Denmark, Malta, and the UK. In this sense, it is similar to the Eurozone and the 
Schengen regime in which not all member states are involved. Yet, as with all institutional designs of 
differentiated integration, the onset of PESCO begs the question of how this initiative will relate to 
third countries that are not full members of the EU. The question becomes all the more relevant in 
the context of PESCO given the complexity of the security threats that Europe is facing which often 
defy the internal-external distinction ranging from Islamic fundamentalism to right-wing populism 
and the vastness of the geographic area covering China and Russia as well as the Middle East and 
Africa, from where external security threats to Europe emanate. Both the complexity and the scope 
of these threats necessitate that the EU employ feasible and effective mechanisms in integrating key 
third countries in its future defense initiatives within the scope of PESCO. 
The cooperation between PESCO and third countries is an area that remains overlooked in the 
present arrangement. The current set up of PESCO stipulates that member states may invite third 
countries to take part in projects to which they can bring ͞substantial added value͟ but that these 
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third countries do not have decision-making rights. Hence, while leaving the door open to third 
country involvement, in line with the ͞all but the institutions͟ dictum of the EU, this provision runs 
the risk of hampering any substantial cooperation with third parties in a field where flexible 
integration applies. Such a rule implies that the EU may be bereft of any meaningful input by key 
third countries that otherwise play significant roles in matters concerning European security and 
defense. This understanding excludes countries such as Norway, which is a key player in conflict 
resolution and mediation; the UK, which is a strong policy actor with a wide geographic outreach; 
and Turkey, which is a key partner in counterterrorism and a regional pivot in the Middle East and 
the Balkans with a growing presence in Africa.  
Furthermore, the modality of these countries’ involvement in PESCO also directly impacts the future 
of EU-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) collaboration, which also remains unclear under the 
PESCO arrangements. Although it is clear that, especially from the U.S. perspective, PESCO could be 
perceived as an important step towards burden sharing in the security field, tighter coordination 
between the EU and NATO particularly concerning capability planning will be necessary to avoid 
leaving member states having to face competing expectations from both sides. Complementarity 
rather than conflict should define the EU-NATO relationship after PESCO. Yet, effective EU-NATO 
collaboration, now also driven by the establishment of PESCO in addition to increasing security 
imperatives, hinges also on the successful security collaboration between the EU and non-EU 
member NATO states. This is best demonstrated through the EU’s relationship with Turkey. 
EU-NATO relations entered a severe impasse in relation to the contested role of Cyprus in EU-NATO 
cooperation after its membership in 2004. Turkey vetoed the signing of a security agreement 
between NATO and Cyprus, which would have led to Cyprus’ inclusion in the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) and thus to its inclusion in EU-NATO cooperation. Meanwhile, Cyprus vetoed the EU-Turkey 
Security Agreement on the exchange of classified material between the two sides and Turkish 
membership of the European Defense Agency (EDA). This double veto has in effect led to the freezing 
of the EU-NATO dialogue and prevents any substantial collaborative operation between the EU and 
NATO.  
The EU-NATO joint declaration adopted in Warsaw in 2016, where Turkey chose not to exercise its 
veto power, relaunched hopes for cooperation and intensified the strategic partnership amid rising 
security concerns on both fronts in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Yet, it still 
remains unclear how this cooperation will move forward given the frozen nature of the Cyprus 
conflict, with no prospects of resolution in sight. The membership of Cyprus in PESCO and the 
pressing need for the specification of the modalities of EU-NATO collaboration through PESCO at a 
time when the overall EU-Turkey relationship is also stagnating constitute causes of concern for the 
future of PESCO as well as for European security writ large.  
PESCO bears the potential to provide an opportunity to overcome this impasse. However, such 
compromise may be accomplished only through specifying such modalities that will allow for a 
meaningful and inclusive contribution of NATO member third parties including, but not exclusive to, 
Turkey. In principle, and in the short to medium term, this could be achieved via granting NATO 
member third countries the right to consultation in deciding on PESCO’s policy direction in the 
Council of Ministers and full participatory rights in PESCO’s capability and operational modules 
through which defense related projects will be implemented. Given the fact that a treaty change to 
grant third countries decision-making powers in areas subject to differentiated integration such as 
PESCO is not probable for the near future, this could be one way to break the impasse.      
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Cyprus can be expected to veto this or similar arrangements where they concern the involvement of 
Turkey. Yet, it is also clear that Cyprus does not possess the required military presence or the 
capabilities to participate in every PESCO module in which the member states will agree on. Thus, it 
would be up to the participating member states in the modules to agree on the inclusion of third 
countries in the projects to which they are contributing. While more operational PESCO projects 
would benefit from Turkish involvement, especially those that are geared towards the development 
and transfer of defense technology would overlap with Turkey’s own needs in this field.   
This could be a realistic way to overcome the Cypriot veto and strengthen the European security 
complex by allowing a substantive contribution from Turkey as well as other NATO countries not 
belonging to the EU. Participating in nine out of thirty EU-led operations, Turkey has so far been the 
biggest contributor to European operations after France, Germany, and Britain. Furthermore, this 
mechanism could provide a novel way to foster mutual trust between the EU and Turkey and 
possibly contribute to breaking the vicious cycle of blockage with NATO. Perhaps most importantly, 
such meaningful inclusion could help anchor Turkey in the European security framework at a time 
when Turkey’s commitment to NATO is increasingly being questioned. Turkey’s decision to purchase 
a Russian-made S-400 missile system has caused a lot of international controversy over the country’s 
place in the Western security bloc, yet the fact that the very same country signed an agreement on 
November 8, 2017 with fellow NATO members France and Italy to develop its national air and missile 
defense systems attests to the available space through which Europe can engage more strongly with 
Turkey. Precisely because of Turkey’s domestic troubles, which are reflected in the volatility of its 
foreign and security policy initiatives, novel forms of anchorage beyond the weakened accession 
framework are necessary for the sake of wider European security. 
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